We investigated the relationship between action-outcome contingency and stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN), a motivationally sensitive event-related potential. Neuroimaging studies have shown that insular cortex (a known source of the SPN) is more activated prior to rewards that are contingent on prior correct action than rewards that are given gratuitously. We compared two gambling tasks, one in which the participant attempted to guess the profitable key-press option (choice) and one in which rewards were simply given at random (no-choice). The SPN that developed in anticipation of feedback was larger in the choice condition, especially at right anterolateral sites. These findings suggest that the SPN specifically reflects the expectation of response reinforcement, rather than anticipatory attention toward emotionally salient stimuli.
Introduction
The learning and execution of goal-directed behavior exhibit an exquisite sensitivity to action-outcome contingency. In the classical view [1] the organism forms an association between a response emitted in a particular setting and its rewarding or punishing consequences. Neurobiological research has shown that the development of such associations involves dopamine-mediated alterations in synaptic plasticity [2] . Mesencephalic dopamine cells fire upon receipt of unexpectedly large rewards and then, as the action-outcome association becomes well established, during the anticipation of rewards [3] . Congruent with this account, neuroimaging studies have shown that a variety of brain areas are more active during the expectation of a reward that is contingent upon correct previous responding than one that is given gratuitously [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Among these brain areas, there are two that each of the just-cited studies agree upon as exhibiting this pattern-the dorsal striatum and the anterior insula/frontal operculum.
The insula/operculum region is relevant to the present research because it is one of the main generators of the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN; [9, 10] ), which is a putative electrophysiological index of reward anticipation. The SPN is usually largest over right prefrontal cortex, crescendoing as the arrival of a motivationally relevant stimulus draws near. Such stimuli can include money, performance feedback, evocative photos or electric shocks [9, 11, 12] . Consistent with the assumption that the SPN reflects activity within cortical portions of the reward system, this surface negative component is greatly reduced in patients whose dopamine systems have been compromised by Parkinson's disease [13] .
It stands to reason that, if insular/opercular activation is greater during anticipation of response-contingent than gratuitous rewards, and if this cortical region does indeed contribute to the SPN, then SPN amplitude should reflect action-outcome contingency. Testing this hypothesis against the alternative that SPN merely indexes the anticipation of affectively salient stimuli is important for identifying the functional significance of this component.
Our experiment was modeled after a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study in which participants' perception of response-outcome contingency was manipulated [5, 6] . Perceptual and motor factors were roughly equated but in one condition ('choice') the participants were led to believe that their responses determined the monetary gain or loss. In the other condition ('no-choice'), they correctly understood that there was no such relationship. In the choice condition, Tricomi et al. [5, 6] found greater activation in the caudate and downstream structures that included the anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus. For our similar study, we predicted a larger SPN on choice than no-choice trials.
Methods

Participants
Twelve, right-handed, neurologically normal, young women (aged 20-23, mean age 22.0 years) were tested in this event-related potential experiment. They were paid for their participation and gave their informed consent. This study was approved by the Waseda University Ethics Committee.
Stimuli and procedure
Each trial began with the presentation of two boxes positioned to the left and right of a fixation cross (Fig. 1) . Five-hundred milliseconds later, the boxes filled with either a pair of question marks (choice condition) or exclamation marks (no-choice). Upon seeing the paired exclamation marks, participants simply pressed the thumb button on the response box. They were told that they had no control over the outcome on these trials. By contrast, on the choice trials they were instructed to select either the first or second-finger key when they saw the paired question marks. They were told that if they succeeded in guessing the correct button on these trials there would be a monetary gain (win). As soon as participants responded in the choice condition, the fixation cross was replaced by a blue, left-or rightpointing arrowhead, indicating the chosen option. In the no-choice condition, a blue diamond replaced the fixation cross to simply indicate that the response had been registered.
The feedback was delivered to the participant 2.5 s after their response, informing them of the monetary outcome. The picture of an intact, 50 Japanese-yen coin indicated gain, whereas a broken coin represented loss. In the nochoice condition, either a pair of intact or broken coins were displayed in the boxes. In the choice condition, by contrast, one box showed an intact and the other a broken coin. An intact coin on the chosen side indicated that 50 had been won; a broken coin on that side indicated a loss of f50 (roughly equal to U.S. $0.50).
Before the experimental blocks there was a training session consisting of two blocks of 64 trials. The task was similar except that the feedback was noninformative (viz, gray-colored disks corresponding in size to the coins) and no money was won or lost. The experimental session consisted of five blocks of 64 trials. Half of the trials within each block were choice and half were no-choice, selected randomly. Win and loss trials occurred at approximately a 50 : 50 ratio. In addition to any net winnings, participants were paid f1500 for their service.
Recordings and data analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 128 sites using Ag/AgCl electrodes. Horizontal electrooculograms (EOGs) were recorded from positions lateral to the left and right outer canthi. Vertical EOGs were obtained with electrodes above and below the left eye. EEGs and EOGs were recorded with a bandwidth of DC to 51 Hz ( -3 dB /octave) using a Biosemi Active Two system (Biosemi, Inc., Amsterdam, Netherlands) and a sampling rate of 256 Hz. Processing of the EEG was performed with Brain Vision Analyzer (Brain Products, Munich, Germany). The EEG was re-referenced to digitally linked ear lobes and corrected for ocular movement artifacts offline [14] .
The EEG epochs were time-locked to feedback onset. After segmentation and signal averaging the waveforms were further low-pass filtered with a 12-Hz cutoff (rolloff: 12 dB/octave). Mean amplitude of the SPN was measured within a window extending 200 ms before the onset of feedback, at electrode sites F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, P4, T7 and T8. The baseline for these measurements extended from -2400 to -2200 ms with respect to feedback onset. Per condition amplitude means were then subjected to a 3-way analysis of variance with factors of condition (two levels), caudality (four), and hemisphere (two). Where post-hoc comparisons were required, the Newman-Keuls test was used. Statistical analyses were based on voltage measurements but, for illustrative purposes, scalp topographical maps of current source density (CSD) are shown. Laplacian transformations of the grand averaged, choice-minusno-choice difference waves were calculated using Brain Vision Analyzer for the interval extending from -207 to -4 ms before feedback. These computations involved spherical spline interpolation (order of splines, four; maximal degree of Legendre polynomials, 10; default Lambda, 10 -5 ) [15] .
Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment we administered a brief, 7-point, Likert-scale questionnaire, modeled after that of Tricomi et al. [6] . Participants rated how much control they felt they had over whether they won or lost money during the choice and no-choice trials ('sense of control') and their degree of confidence in discerning a pattern to the correct responses ('degree of certainty').
Results
Behavioral data
Mean response time was significantly longer for the choice (M ± SEM: 1091 ± 136 ms) than for the no-choice condition (669 ± 49 ms; t(11)=4.29, P < 0.01). The number of errors, in the sense of confusing the thumb and finger buttons, was very low (1.3 ± 0.5 for the choice vs. 1.0 ± 0.2 for the no-choice) and did not differ between conditions (t(11)=0.40, not significant). Results for the post-experimental questionnaires confirmed the effectiveness of our manipulation. Participants rated their sense of control as significantly higher in the choice (3.25 ± 0.3) than in the no-choice condition (1.75 ± 0.3; t(11)=3.00, P < 0.05). Their degree of certainty about the existence of a pattern to the winning answers was also significantly higher in the choice than in the no-choice condition (4.58 ± 0.3 and 3.00 ± 0.4, respectively; t(11)=3.27, P < 0.01).
Stimulus preceding negativity Figure 2 shows the grand-averaged SPN waveforms (top panel) and the CSD distribution for the difference between the two conditions (bottom panel). The SPN started developing just after the key-press response and gradually increased until feedback onset in both conditions. However, the waveform was clearly larger for the choice than for no-choice condition. As the CSD map shows, the amplitude difference between conditions was greatest at right, anterolateral scalp sites, consistent with the predicted contribution of right, insular/opercular cortex.
The 3-way analysis of variance confirmed that SPN was larger in the choice than in the no-choice condition [F(1,11)=12.76, P < 0.005], and over the right than left hemisphere [F(1,11)=17.82, P < 0.005]. In addition, smaller amplitudes over temporal regions were documented [F(3,33)=3.77, e=0.68, P < 0.05; post-hoc test, P < 0.05]. No interactions were found.
Discussion
We investigated the relationship between the SPN and action-outcome contingency in a gambling task with two contrasting conditions, choice and no-choice. Participants rated their sense of control over the outcome and their ability to predict the winning answer as greater in the choice condition. Reflecting this perceived contingency, the SPN was larger in the choice than no-choice condition especially at right anterolateral sites. We predicted this result based on four relevant fMRI studies that had shown greater activation of the anterior insula/frontal operculum region preceding action-contingent rewards as compared to gratuitously given rewards [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Our prediction was also based on evidence that the right insula/operculum contributes to the SPN that precedes motivationally significant stimuli [9, 10] .
It had been argued at one time that the increased activation within dopamine target structures when rewards are contingent on action might merely be because of the greater salience of such rewards or to the nonspecific arousal associated with making a movement [8] . However, the fMRI study by Tricomi et al. [5, 6] equated motor requirements across conditions but still found greater activation when outcomes were perceived by the participants to have been contingent on their responses. Our electrophysiological study was modeled on that experiment and our similar positive results support those conclusions. It is not the mere presence of movement that matters. Rather, what is critical is the perception that rewards and punishment are contingent upon certain actions.
Our study provides further evidence that, among the various neocortical regions that contribute to the SPN, the right anterior insula and overlapping inferior frontal gyrus are especially sensitive to the anticipation of affective/motivational stimuli. Of course, this is likely to comprise only a portion of the brain regions that are activated during the anticipation of a task-relevant stimulus. Other regions may play a more general role in perceptual attention (e.g. intraparietal sulcus and frontal eye fields [16] ), accounting for the modality-and visuospatially-specific SPN topographies that are sometimes observed [17, 18] . Not surprisingly, the anticipation of stimuli that are neither motivationally relevant, response-contingent, nor perceptually demanding such as trial-by-trial task instructions is associated with only small, non-lateralized SPNs [12] . If the SPN is to play a useful role in the study of reward processing and dopaminergic disorders, it will be important to develop methods for isolating the insular/opercular generator.
Conclusion
The increased SPN amplitude at fronto-lateral sites observed in the choice condition supported our hypothesis: This motivationally sensitive component reflects anticipation of rewards or punishments that are perceived to be contingent upon prior action rather than attention toward salient stimuli, per se. Grand-averaged waveforms of stimulus-preceding negativity. Thick lines represent the choice condition and thin lines represent the no-choice condition. The lower panel depicts current source density maps of the difference wave (choice minus no-choice). Note the right-hemisphere predominance over frontolateral sites.
